10年，10个定价错误：我们在没有风险投资的情况下构建SaaS所学到的经验
2015年，我们在没有风险投资和经验不足的情况下推出了我们的第一个SaaS产品。大多数定价选择都是凭直觉或接受了不该采纳的建议。回头看，今天看起来显而易见的事情，当时并不明显。我们通过艰难的方式学到了这些教训。
**分层定价。**
在纸面上，这看起来是公平的。一个拥有15个用户的团队支付39美元，但再增加一个用户就跳到了119美元。在一个层级内，客户很高兴，因为每个用户的成本降低了。但跨越层级时，他们却变得愤怒。人们流失，要求折扣，或者发送愤怒的邮件。这个模式并没有奖励增长，反而惩罚了它。
**按用户计费。**
最终，收入与客户规模成正比。但这吸引了许多独立用户和小团队。由于Everhour与项目工具同步，即使是一个自由职业者也可能用数百个项目和任务淹没系统。他们几乎不支付费用，却造成了巨大的负担，并且是最吵闹的一群：愤怒的推文、退款请求、无尽的工单。较大的团队则更加冷静和忠诚。
为了解决这个问题，我们设定了5个座位的最低要求。
你可以使用更少的座位，但仍需支付5个座位的费用。这过滤掉了自由职业者，提高了我们的平均消费，并使我们与合适的客户对接。虽然有些人抱怨这太贵，但那些重视产品的客户留下来了。后来，我们为最多5个用户提供了一个没有集成的免费计划。这为小团队提供了留存的机会，并使我们在“最佳免费工具”博客中获得了推荐。这更多地起到了营销作用，而不是变现。
**我们Trello附加组件的固定费用定价。**
每月10美元，无限制用户和项目。在超过30,000名活跃用户中，只有约500人付费。其他人一旦我们要求付费就立刻离开。产品过于简单，无法进行追加销售。
**老用户保护。**
如果有人注册了旧计划，他们可以永久保留。没有强制升级，也没有意外涨价。许多人至今仍在支付。我们尝试通过额外功能和忠诚折扣来引导他们转向新计划，但只有小部分人转变。如果他们的计划运作良好，支付更多的障碍就显得过于强大。
**折扣。**
对大客户的批量折扣效果很好，帮助达成交易。紧迫感促销，比如“在5天内注册可享受20%折扣”，带来了小幅的转化提升和改善的留存。这些客户留存时间更长，因为他们不想失去优惠。但这对现有用户而言感觉不公平。有些人甚至试图取消再重新订阅。最终我们停止了这种做法。
**计费机制的教训。**
最初我们按用户计费，并将按比例费用推迟到下一个周期。从理论上讲是合理的，但在实践中却很混乱。客户在续订前取消，我们损失了钱，尤其是年度订阅。其他客户在银行对账单上无法识别总额。我们尝试在添加用户时立即收取按比例费用。这解决了收入问题，但产生了太多的小额支付和发票。客户讨厌在更换用户时产生多次收费。
最终我们转向了按座位计费。
提前购买座位，灵活使用，发票保持清晰。虽然仍不完美，有些人忘记删除空座位，之后会抱怨。但总体而言，这种方式干净多了。今天，这基本上成为了SaaS的标准。
**教训。**
- 分层定价看似公平，直到你跨越层级。那时，客户会感到愤怒。
- 独立用户给我们的系统带来了过载，却带来了很少的收入。
- “微型”计划增加了支持成本，却没有转化。
- 固定费用定价吸引了超过30,000名用户，但几乎没有人付费。
- 没有最低座位限制导致小额消费和错误的受众。
- 多个计划增加了复杂性。大多数人仍然选择同一个计划。
- 对老用户的追加销售失败。如果旧计划有效，他们就不会支付更多。
- 折扣促销短期有效，但感觉不公平并被滥用。
- 按用户计费的按比例费用使发票变得混乱，并导致我们损失资金。
- 免费计划提升了营销可见性，而不是升级。
这接近这里的4,000字符限制。更多细节和截图请访问：https://medium.com/@citizenblr/lessons-from-10-years-of-saas-pricing-experiments-4ed45f552171
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Back in 2015 we launched our first SaaS with no VC and little experience. Most pricing choices came from gut feeling or advice we shouldn’t have taken. Looking back, what feels obvious today wasn’t obvious back then. We learned the hard way.<p>Tiered pricing.<p>On paper it looked fair. A team with 15 users paid $39 but adding one more jumped it to $119. Inside a tier customers were happy as cost per user dropped. But crossing a tier made them furious. People churned, demanded discounts or sent angry emails. Instead of rewarding growth the model punished it.<p>Per-user billing.<p>Finally revenue scaled with customers. But it attracted many solo users and tiny teams. Because Everhour syncs with project tools, even one freelancer could flood the system with hundreds of projects and tasks. They paid almost nothing but created huge load and were the loudest group: angry tweets, refund requests, endless tickets. Larger teams were calmer and more loyal.<p>To fix this we set a 5-seat minimum.<p>You could use fewer but still pay for 5. It filtered out freelancers, raised our average check and aligned us with the right customers. Some complained it was too expensive but those who valued the product stayed. Later we added a free plan for up to 5 users without integrations. This gave small teams a way to stick around and got us listed in “Top Free Tools” blogs. It worked more as marketing than monetization.<p>Flat-fee pricing in our Trello add-on.<p>$10/month, unlimited users and projects. Out of 30,000+ active users only ~500 paid. Everyone else left the moment we asked for money. The product was too simple for upsells.<p>Grandfathering.<p>If someone signed up on old plan they could keep it forever. No forced upgrades, no surprise hikes. Many are still paying today. We tried nudging them to newer plans with extra features and loyalty discounts, but only a small percentage switched. If their plan worked fine, the barrier to paying more was too strong.<p>Discounts.<p>Volume disc for large clients worked well and helped close deals. Urgency promos like “Sign up in 5 days and get 20% off” gave a small conv boost and improved retention. Those customers stayed longer because they didn’t want to lose their deal. But it felt unfair to existing users. Some even tried canceling and resubscribing. We eventually stopped.<p>Billing mechanics lesson.<p>First we billed per user and deferred prorates to next cycle. Logical in theory, messy in practice. Customers canceled before renewal and we lost money, especially on annuals. Others didn't recognize totals on bank statements. We tried charging prorates immediately when someone was added. That fixed revenue issues but created too many micro payments and invoices. Customers hated multiple charges when swapping users.<p>Eventually moved to per-seat billing.<p>Buy seats in advance, use them flexibly and the invoice stays clear. Still not perfect. Some forget to remove empty seats and complain later. But overall it’s far cleaner. Today it’s basically the SaaS standard.<p>Lessons.<p>- Tiered pricing looks fair until you cross tiers. Then it makes customers angry.
- Solo users overloaded our system while bringing little revenue.
- “Micro” plans added support costs without conversions.
- Flat-fee pricing attracted 30k+ users but barely any paid.
- No minimum seats meant tiny checks and the wrong audience.
- Multiple plans added complexity. Most picked the same one anyway.
- Upselling grandfathered users failed. If old plans worked, they wouldn’t pay more.
- Discount promos helped short term but felt unfair and were abused.
- Per-user prorates turned invoicing into a mess and cost us money.
- Free plans drove marketing visibility, not upgrades.<p>This is near the 4,000 char limit here. More details and screenshots: https://medium.com/@citizenblr/lessons-from-10-years-of-saas-pricing-experiments-4ed45f552171