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我们是FreeTheDotYE运动，这是一个由志愿者主导的努力，旨在解决互联网治理中的长期失误。我们已向ICANN/IANA提交了正式请求，要求重新委托也门的国家代码顶级域名（.YE）。完整请求可在此查看： https://freethedotye.org/letter 核心问题： IANA根区数据库将TeleYemen列为.YE国家代码顶级域名的管理者。自2014-2015年胡塞武装控制萨那以来，TeleYemen的基础设施一直在他们的控制之下。这意味着一个非国家武装团体实际上成为了一个主权国家数字标识符的运营者。重新委托的依据（RFC 1591 & ICP-1）：我们的请求基于已建立的互联网治理原则，而当前运营者显然违反了这些原则： 1. RFC 1591：要求国家代码顶级域名的管理者作为受托人服务于整个当地社区。 2. ICP-1：要求运营者保持中立、具备能力，并服务于公共利益。明显的治理失误与现实世界的滥用： * 服务社区的失败：.YE命名空间专门服务于胡塞武装。也门国际公认的政府和民间社会被迫使用通用顶级域名（.com，.org），而武装团体运营的门户网站则占据了.gov.ye和.edu.ye。 * 军事和敲诈目的的武器化：对`.gov.ye`命名空间的控制被积极用于威胁国际海运。胡塞武装在`hocc.gov.ye`（人道主义行动协调中心）建立了一个网站，作为他们海上行动的掩护。通过这个网站和类似`info@navy.gov.ye`的电子邮件，他们发出军事威胁，并在国家权威的幌子下进行数字敲诈。这是对国家资源的直接滥用，用于军事胁迫。 * 中立性的丧失：.YE域名被用于运营宣传渠道（例如，saba.ye），同一权威利用其对电信的控制来审查和监视活动人士。 * 不稳定性和风险：控制.YE的实体因严重侵犯人权而受到记录，包括绑架记者和拘留联合国工作人员。与此类行为相关的运营者无法被视为稳定或可信的管理者。我们向ICANN的正式请求： 1. 启动对.YE委托的正式审查。 2. 暂时将.YE重新委托给一个中立的国际受托人，直到一个稳定、合法的国家权威能够承担管理责任。这方面有先例可循（例如，.SO索马里重新委托）。这是对多方利益相关者、社区主导的互联网原则在冲突地区是否能够维持的关键考验，在那里，国家代码顶级域名已被转变为战争工具。链接： - 运动网站：https://freethedotye.org - X 个人资料：https://x.com/FreeTheDotYE

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We are the FreeTheDotYE campaign, a volunteer-led effort to address a long-standing failure in internet governance. We have submitted a formal request to ICANN/IANA for the redelegation of Yemen's country-code top-level domain (.YE).The full request can be viewed here:https://freethedotye.org/letterThe Core Problem:The IANA Root Zone Database lists TeleYemen as the manager for the .YE ccTLD. Since the Houthi militia's takeover of Sana'a in 2014-2015, TeleYemen's infrastructure has been under their control. This means a non-state armed group is the de facto operator of a sovereign nation's digital identifier.The Basis for Redelegation (RFC 1591 & ICP-1):Our request is grounded in established internet governance principles that the current operator has clearly violated:1. RFC 1591: Requires a ccTLD manager to serve the entire local community as a trustee.2. ICP-1: Requires the operator to be neutral, competent, and serve the public interest.Demonstrable Governance Failures & Real-World Abuse:* Failure to Serve the Community: The .YE namespace exclusively serves the Houthi militia. Yemen's internationally recognized government and civil society are forced onto generic TLDs (.com, .org), while militia-run portals occupy .gov.ye and .edu.ye.* Weaponization for Military and Extortionist Purposes: The control over the `.gov.ye` namespace is being actively used to threaten international maritime shipping. The Houthis have established a website at `hocc.gov.ye` (Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center) which acts as a front for their maritime operations. Through this site and associated emails like `info@navy.gov.ye`, they issue military threats and run what amounts to a digital extortion racket under the guise of a state authority. This is a direct abuse of a national resource for military coercion.* Loss of Neutrality: The .YE domain is used to run propaganda outlets (e.g., saba.ye), and the same authority uses its control over telecommunications to censor and surveil activists.* Instability and Risk: The entity controlling .YE is documented for severe human rights abuses, including the kidnapping of journalists and detention of UN staff. An operator associated with such acts cannot be considered a stable or trusted steward.Our Formal Request to ICANN:1. Initiate a formal review of the .YE delegation.2. Temporarily redelegate .YE to a neutral international trustee until a stable, legitimate national authority can assume stewardship. There is a precedent for this (e.g., the .SO Somalia redelegation).This is a critical test of whether the principles of a multi-stakeholder, community-led internet can hold in a conflict zone where a ccTLD has been turned into an instrument of war.Links:- Campaign Website: https://freethedotye.org- X profile: https://x.com/FreeTheDotYE

.YE 国家代码顶级域（ccTLD）– 正式重新委托请求至 ICANN/IANA