我追踪了Meta和年龄验证游说活动的20亿美元非营利性拨款。
在过去几个月里,我一直在收集关于美国各州立法机构中一波“年龄验证”法案的公共记录。这些记录包括IRS 990表格、参议院游说披露、州伦理数据库、竞选融资记录、公司注册信息、WHOIS查询以及Wayback Machine档案。最初出于对推动这些法案的人的好奇,最终转变为记录一个协调的影响力行动,从隐私的角度来看,这一行动正在构建操作系统级别的监控基础设施,而背后的公司却没有面临任何新的平台要求。
### 一个在法律上并不存在的倡导组织
数字儿童联盟(Digital Childhood Alliance)自称是一个由50多个保守派儿童安全组织组成的联盟(后来夸大到140多个,但仅有六个曾被公开提及)。该组织在各州为这些法案作证。公共记录显示其法律地位如下:
DCA的域名于2024年12月18日通过GoDaddy注册,带有隐私保护,注册期为四年。网站在一天后上线并完全形成:专业设计、统计数据、来自遗产基金会和NCOSE工作人员的推荐信,以及ASAA的宣传要点已加载。这并不是一个草根启动,而是一个预先构建的网站的阶段性部署。77天后,犹他州的SB-142成为全国首个签署的ASAA法律。
DCA通过For Good(前身为Network for Good,EIN 68-0480736)处理捐款,For Good在其文档中明确表示其服务于“501(c)(3)非营利组织”。DCA声称拥有501(c)(4)身份。DCA在For Good系统中被分类为“项目”(ID 258136),而不是独立的非营利组织。我搜索了过去五年中59,736个For Good资助的受益者,约17.3亿美元的拨款中,没有一笔拨款给DCA、DCI、NCOSE或任何相关实体。捐款页面似乎只是表面功夫。
彭博社的记者在2025年7月揭露Meta是DCA的资助者。Deseret News在2025年12月详细说明了这一安排。在100多个Wayback Machine快照中,没有任何版本的网站披露资金来源。每一篇博客和证词都针对苹果和谷歌,从未提及或批评Meta。
凯西·斯特凡斯基(Casey Stefanski)是执行董事,曾在NCOSE担任全球合作关系高级总监长达10年。不同寻常的是,她从未在任何NCOSE的990表格中以官员、关键员工或五名最高薪酬员工之一的身份出现。在一家年收入540万美元的组织中担任高级总监十年却没有990表格的记录,这表明她的薪酬可能低于阈值、头衔被夸大,或与该安排有关的其他问题。
NCOSE自身的501(c)(4)结构实际上相当复杂。追踪四年的Schedule R文件显示,NCOSE在2021年创建了“NCOSE行动”(EIN 86-2458921)作为c4,2022年将其从c4重新分类为c3,然后在2023年以相同地址和主要官员(Marcel van der Watt)创建了一个全新的c4,名为“公共政策研究所”(EIN 88-1180705)。到2024年,原始实体已完全从Schedule R中消失。
### 超过7000万美元的超级政治行动委员会,故意分散
Meta向州级超级政治行动委员会投入了超过7000万美元,并将每一个都结构化以避免FEC的集中、可搜索数据库:
如果您维护的软件可以根据这些定义被归类为“操作系统提供商”,请开始
完整数据集、OSINT任务清单和所有处理结果已发布,文件中嵌入了来源:github.com/upper-up/meta-lobbying-and-other-findings
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Over the past several months I've been pulling public records on the wave of "age verification" bills moving through US state legislatures. IRS 990 filings, Senate lobbying disclosures, state ethics databases, campaign finance records, corporate registries, WHOIS lookups, Wayback Machine archives. What started as curiosity about who was pushing these bills turned into documenting a coordinated influence operation that, from a privacy standpoint, is building surveillance infrastructure at the operating system level while the company behind it faces zero new requirements for its own platforms.<p>The advocacy group that doesn't legally exist
The Digital Childhood Alliance presents itself as a coalition of 50+ conservative child safety organizations (later inflated to 140+, though only six have ever been publicly named). It has been testifying in favor of these bills across states. Here is what public records show about its legal status:<p>DCA's domain was registered December 18, 2024 through GoDaddy with privacy protection and a four-year registration. The website was live and fully formed one day later: professional design, statistics, testimonials from Heritage Foundation and NCOSE staff, ASAA talking points already loaded. This is not a grassroots launch. This is a staging deployment of a pre-built site. 77 days later, Utah SB-142 became the first ASAA law signed in the country.<p>DCA processes donations through For Good (formerly Network for Good, EIN 68-0480736), which is a Donor Advised Fund. For Good explicitly states in its documentation that it serves "501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations." DCA claims 501(c)(4) status. DCA is classified as a "Project" (ID 258136) in the For Good system, not as a standalone nonprofit. I searched all 59,736 For Good grant recipients across five years, roughly $1.73 billion in disbursements. Zero grants to DCA, DCI, NCOSE, or any related entity. The donation page appears to be cosmetic.<p>Bloomberg reporters exposed Meta as a DCA funder in July 2025. The Deseret News detailed the arrangement in December 2025. No version of the website, across 100+ Wayback Machine snapshots, has ever disclosed funding sources. Every blog post and testimony targets Apple and Google. Meta is never mentioned or criticized.<p>Casey Stefanski, Executive Director, spent 10 years at NCOSE as Senior Director of Global Partnerships. Unusually, she never appears on any NCOSE 990 filing as an officer, key employee, or among the five highest-compensated staff. A senior director title at a $5.4M organization for a decade with no 990 appearance suggests either below-threshold compensation, an inflated title, or something else about the arrangement.<p>NCOSE's own 501(c)(4) structure turns out to be complicated. Tracing Schedule R filings across four years reveals that NCOSE created "NCOSE Action" (EIN 86-2458921) as a c4 in 2021, reclassified it from c4 to c3 in 2022, then created an entirely new c4 called "Institute for Public Policy" (EIN 88-1180705) in 2023 with the same address and the same principal officer (Marcel van der Watt). By 2024 the original entity had disappeared from Schedule R entirely.<p>$70M+ in super PACs, deliberately fragmented
Meta poured over $70 million into state-level super PACs and structured every one to avoid the FEC's centralized, searchable database:<p>If you maintain software that could be classified as an "operating system provider" under these definitions, start
Full dataset, OSINT tasklist, and all processed findings are published with sources embedded in each file: github.com/upper-up/meta-lobbying-and-other-findings